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A FUTURE FOR LEGAL EDUCATION:  




Legal education in the university sector faces major challenges as we digest the 
recommendations of the Legal Education and Training Review and prepare to respond to the 
changed regulatory environment currently under planning by the Solicitors’ Regulatory 
Authority (SRA) and the Bar Standards Board (BSB). This paper is developed from one 
presented at the Nottingham Centre for Legal Education’s first Conference on 7 – 8 February 
2014. My starting point is that this challenge provides us with a huge opportunity to approach 
our goals of designing challenging educational experiences for our students while also 
contributing in a serious way to the personal development of all and the professional 
development of those interested in entering legal practice. My focus is on the undergraduate 
law degree, although some of my proposals will be relevant to the Graduate Diploma in Law. 
My proposal is that we and our students will benefit from our addressing professional ethics 
in the undergraduate degree, particularly if we think about how it might inform our overall 
curriculum and if we develop appropriate learning methods to do so. This development, 
effectively implemented, will contribute to ensuring a future for academic legal education.  
LIBERAL, VOCATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LEGAL EDUCATION 
Proposing to introduce professional ethics into an academic degree raises hackles in some 
quarters. It is seen as fundamentally vocational in nature and as such antipathetic to the 
educational goals of an undergraduate degree. It could certainly be introduced in such a way 
and I share the view that this would be damaging. I need, therefore to be clear that I am not 
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proposing that we should teach students the contents of the professional Codes of Conduct. 
This would be narrow vocationalism, pander to the differently narrow mind-set of the black-
letter law lecturer1 and be deadly dull. What is more, the knowledge gained would fade as it 
would exist outside any context or experience, and by the time those students who made it 
into legal practice were able to make use of it, would be out of date.  
Michael Lower distinguishes between vocational and professional legal education.  
 
Professional education is concerned with a knowledge base, a way of 
reasoning, and an introduction to relevant theory and ideology. Vocational 
training builds on this but is concerned with the know-how that can be put to 
use in the office. A professional legal education is one version of a liberal or 
academic education.2 
 
Quoting Bradney, he links this with the purpose of liberal legal education which “involves a 
search for structures and seeks to inculcate in a student an awareness of the all-pervasive 
nature of values and questions about values in the world that surrounds them”.3 I share this 
view and will argue that professional ethics may be an effective vector for achieving these 
aims.  
 
THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
In order to place the functions of legal education in their legislative context it is worth going 
back to the Legal Services Act 2007. This establishes regulatory objectives for the SRA and 
the BSB and their own regulator, the Legal Services Board (LSB). Amongst those objectives 
is “encouraging an independent, strong, diverse and effective legal profession”.4 What is 
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more, the LSB has prioritised this amongst its objectives. “Education and training is one of a 
number of tools available to regulators to manage risk and support the delivery of the 
regulatory objectives set out in the Act. We consider this has particular relevance to two of 
the regulatory objectives - protecting and promoting the interests of consumers; and 
encouraging an independent, strong, diverse and effective legal profession.”5 The profession 
is made of its members. We should be encouraging their independence of mind as well as 
their intellectual abilities. We should also be encouraging in those of our students who do not 
go on into the legal profession an understanding of what is expected of lawyers and the 
values that underpin their practice so that as engaged citizens they can hold the legal 
profession to account.  
The Legal Education and Training Review researched the views of practitioners, 
regulators, academics and other “stakeholders” as to what legal education should address. 
They found: “The centrality of professional ethics and legal values to practice across the 
regulated workforce is one of the clearest conclusions to be drawn from the LETR research 
data.”6 They also said: “The importance of ethics is signalled, to a high degree, throughout 
the qualitative data. Professional ethics, and its regulation, are seen as a critical defining 
feature of professional service.”7 This led to two key recommendations:  
 
Recommendation 6: LSET schemes should include appropriate learning 
outcomes in respect of professional ethics, legal research, and the demonstration 
of a range of written and oral communication skills.  
Recommendation 7: The learning outcomes at initial stages of LSET should 
include reference (as appropriate to the individual practitioner’s role) to an 
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understanding of the relationship between morality and law, the values 
underpinning the legal system, and the role of lawyers in relation to those values.   
 
Recommendation 6 refers to the outcomes that entrants to the profession should be able to 
demonstrate at the time of entering practice. It sets the context for recommendation 7, which 
proposes outcomes for the undergraduate or academic stage of legal education. It reminds us 
that what we should aspire to is not limited to knowledge but must encompass understanding, 
and not merely understanding of the law but of the nature and values of law. This is a 
normative and not merely a descriptive analysis. It requires us to test laws against underlying 
values and to be willing to question those values. The interaction of people and the law is 
mediated by lawyers and students therefore need to understand something of lawyers’ work 
and the values that might underpin it. This is both a professional and a liberal legal education.  
 
VALUES IN LEGAL EDUCATION 
Francis Bacon famously said “Knowledge itself is power”.8  He was talking about the 
knowledge of God, but his words have been used more often to talk about the knowledge of 
humans. A law degree provides its students with a lot of knowledge, and knowledge of the 
legal tools for controlling human behaviour may indeed provide those who acquire it with 
power. Equally famously, power is said to tend to corrupt.9 We would not consider denying 
our students knowledge just because of that corrupting tendency. However, we can design 
our courses so that we provide students with the skills to use that power effectively and the 
values to use it well.  
Carrie Menkel-Meadow has provided guidance on how we might approach this: ‘In my 
view, what modern legal education should prepare students for is a set of values and skills 
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that are informed by what “legal” values and law offer to deal with what are essentially 
human needs.’10 The legal values she identifies as “Realisation of ‘justice’” and she presents 
a set of general “problem-solving” skills. 
A sensitivity to: 
i. Fairness 
ii. Peace 
iii. Decision making 
iv. Leadership, facilitation and management 
v. Creativity 
vi. Counselling and collaboration 
vii. Governance.11 
She goes on to apply this by exploring the values of lawyering in terms of “making, not 
breaking things”.12 The ensuing discussion explores legal values not only in their own right 
but through comparisons with those of other professions. This leads to suggestions as to what 
we need to encourage our students to learn and proposals as to creative outcomes that might 
be sought from the “crisis in legal education”. These relate particularly to circumstances in 
the USA but provide a stimulus for our own aspirations.  
A major recent contribution to this debate is the Carnegie Report, Educating Lawyers.13 
Drawing from a wide experience far beyond that of legal educators they identify three 
apprenticeships of professional education. These are: 
 
1. the intellectual or cognitive apprenticeship, which “focuses the students on the 
knowledge and way of thinking of the profession”. 
2. an apprenticeship “to the forms of expert practice shared by competent practitioners”.  
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3. “the apprenticeship of identity and purpose [which] introduces students to the 
purposes and attitudes that are guided by the values for which the professional 
community is responsible … it also shares aspects of liberal education in attempting 
to provide a wide, ethically sensitive perspective … the essential goal … is to teach 
the skills and inclinations, along with the ethical standards, social roles, and 
responsibilities … it is the ethical-social apprenticeship through which the student’s 
professional self can be … explored and developed.”14 
The Report goes on to argue: “If professional legal education is to introduce students to 
the full range of professional demands, it has to initiate learners into all three apprenticeships. 
But it is the ethical-social apprenticeship through which the student’s professional self can be 
most broadly explored and developed.”15 As with Lower the deep link between liberal and 
professional education is at the heart of this analysis.  
THERE’S NO ROOM IN THE SYLLABUS 
Academic resistance to the “Foundations of Legal Knowledge”16 imposed on the qualifying 
law degree by the professions is understandable and many will welcome it if the results of 
the SRA’s development of an outcomes approach to regulating legal education include their 
abandonment. Whether or not this happens, there has been a closely-associated claim that 
the syllabus is already full and that there is no scope to introduce a new subject such as 
professional ethics. My response to this is two-fold. The first is that professional ethics is 
not necessarily best introduced to the LLB degree in the form of a discrete module or 
subject.17 I will develop an alternative approach below. My second response is that it is not 
inherently impossible. This can be demonstrated by the experience of the Graduate Diploma 
in Law programme at City University London. The professional requirements of this one-
year full-time programme include coverage of the Foundations of Legal Knowledge plus 
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one additional Foundation subject at the choice of the course provider. The Director of the 
GDL at City, David Herling, introduced Legal Ethics as the additional Foundation subject in 
order to enable students “to reflect on the ethical challenges that you might face as a lawyer 
in practice”.18 An independent evaluation shows that it aims to address, in a thoroughly 
academic way, the issues raised by Carnegie’s third apprenticeship: “City’s legal ethics 
course is oriented towards engaging thought-provoking discussion about values, and 
encourages students to reflect on how their own values will be expressed, tested and 
developed in legal practice.”19 If it is possible to achieve this in the constraints of an 
intensive one-year course which also addresses all the Foundations of Legal Knowledge, 
this can clearly be achieved in the three years of an undergraduate degree.  
 
AN INTEGRATIVE FUNCTION FOR PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 
The Carnegie Report notes that the three apprenticeships they identify tend to be in different 
hands: “Yet within the professional school, each of these aspects of the whole ensemble 
tends to be the province of different personnel, who often understand their function 
differently and may be guided by different, even conflicting goals.”20 This tendency is 
exacerbated if professional ethics is placed in one of a number of discrete subjects in a 
degree course. The traditional model of legal education tends to operate in this way. As Jon 
Harman observed:  
 
One of the problems with language learning is the way it is taught, very linear 
and strangely scaffolded. I see similar parallels with legal education in how 
the foundations are taught, seldom with the relational conceptual elements. I 
once explained to John Flood that I saw the teaching of legal education akin 
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to teaching the human anatomy without explaining the interconnecting 
relationships - this week the foot, next week the heart and so forth.21  
 
Similar observations have been made about this traditional model in more academic 
publications. Richard Johnstone describes it as: “Repetitive, incoherent between years and 
without planned incremental development, and narrowly focused on doctrine rather than 
skills, theory, values or attitudes …”.22 Earlier, Mary Keyes and Richard Johnstone had 
identified more related characteristics of the traditional model:  
 
Students are taught the same type of material – a detailed analysis of common 
law rules – and are given the same kind of assessment – examinations testing 
mastery of the legal rules and their application to hypothetical problems – 
semester after semester, in much the same way … The only thing that changes 
between subjects and between semesters in the student’s progression through 
the degree is the substantive rules which forms the content of the subjects.23  
 
Today this rarely represents the totality of a law student’s undergraduate experience. 
However, in spite of the existence of admirable exceptions, I suggest that most of us will 
recognise that many of the modules studied by our students share these characteristics. This is 
stultifying. It tends towards teacher-centred module design leading to passive learning by the 
student whereas modern learning theory consistently stresses the centrality of student 
learning in course design. “Learning takes place through the active behaviour of the student; 
it is what [s]he does that [s]he learns, not what the teacher does.”24  
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Johnstone’s proposal to address this dilemma is a “whole of curriculum design”. As he 
says:   
 
A good law curriculum also needs to be congruent, integrating the teaching 
of skills, doctrine, theory and ethics and values, and coordinating the 
curriculum so that students can develop their knowledge, skills and values 
progressively or incrementally. In other words, the relationship between 
subjects in the curriculum needs to be congruent – both across the 
curriculum and through the curriculum.’25  
 
Johnstone gives two examples of law degrees designed in this way. The first is at the 
University of Technology Sydney, whose curriculum identifies the attributes the degree seeks 
to encourage in students and maps them across the stages of the degree. The figure below 
distinguishes intellectual, professional and personal attributes which to a degree mirror the 
three apprenticeships identified in the Carnegie Report.  You can see how, for example, 
ethics is mapped across the three years of the programme, with specific responsibility for it 
being accepted in a number of different modules. This enables both a progressive treatment 
of students’ learning and an enhancement of those modules in which it is addressed to lessen 
the extent to which they are as repetitive as in the traditional model.  
Figure 126  
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His second example is at Griffith Law School. Here, the same approach was further 
developed by identifying a series of vertical subjects which were incorporated into a vertical 
curriculum. This requires students, in each vertical subject:  
 
1. in the early years of the undergraduate program to engage with the basic 
principles governing its subject matter and skills; 
2. in later years to engage with more advanced principles and skills, and the 
relationship between these principles and skills and other principles and 
skills; 
3. at all stages of the program to use and practice the principles; and 
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4. at all stages to undertake assessment tasks in relation to the skill and/or 
subject matter. 27 
 
Vertical subjects include skills such as group work, and concepts such as legal ethics. The 
key concept is to identify points at each stage in the curriculum where each may be addressed 
in a way which allows for coherence and progression. Michael Robertson, writing at the 
planning stage of the Griffith vertical curriculum, explains:   
 
The vertical subject is a continuing one that would progress throughout the 
programme in a carefully structured way. It would intersect with and reside 
within various courses in each semester or year of the programme. The levels 
of understanding contained in ethics learning objectives would increase in 
complexity from one host subject to the next. Points of co-existence with 
other subject areas would be determined by the extent to which practice in 
those substantive areas unavoidably implicated enquiries about both the role 
of the lawyer and ethical decision-making in particular. Moreover, in each 
site in which the vertical subject co-existed with the traditional subject area, 
ethics learning objectives, teaching and assessment within the host subject 
would need to be carefully aligned.28 
 
This requires a degree of control over the curriculum that may be hard to achieve in many 
law schools. However, it is clearly possible as the experience of law schools at Griffith and 
UTS show. Moreover, these curricula integrated a number of vertical subjects. My proposal is 
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curriculum in the way described by Robertson. It would thus meet many of the goals 
identified by Deborah Rhode in her seminal paper on ethics by the pervasive method29 and 
avoid some of the problems she identifies in later writing.30 Thus, rather than requiring 
teachers who are uninterested in or antagonistic towards introducing ethics into their classes 
it should be possible, in a willing faculty, to identify colleagues for whom this will be a 
worthwhile intellectual and teaching challenge. By providing a coherent, progressive 
development of students’ understanding we should avoid the risk that ethics be perceived as 
relatively unimportant by not justifying a subject or module of its own. 
Different law schools may, of course, take divergent views as to what is appropriate at the 
undergraduate stage in terms of coverage and personal development. If the professional 
regulators do remove content requirements as they shift to an outcomes approach there will 
be considerable scope for such divergence. It may be that one law school would regard their 
central interest to be to develop students’ understanding of the ways in which lawyers 
interacted with lay clients in different ways and in different circumstances. This might lead to 
an identification of at least one module in each year which allowed for this. Criminal law, 
Obligations and Commercial law spring to mind as a possible set which would be simple to 
introduce and integrate. Another law school might be more concerned to develop students’ 
intellectual understanding of the relationship between law and morality. This would be more 
challenging as a reasonably sophisticated understanding of basic philosophical concepts 
would be necessary before any exploration of the relationship was possible. If this were built 
up in selected modules over later years of the programme colleagues would have to devise 
learning activities which introduced students to progressively challenging concepts. This 
should be possible. A third law school might be interested in developing the moral character 
of their students. They would need to design learning experiences combined with reflection 
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on how they were responding to challenges. Here, active use of Rest’s Four Component 
Model of moral development31 and the Defining Issues Test32 would be useful.   
Although there is considerable agreement as to ethical actions, this is not true of the 
justificatory principles, nor of how to identify a hierarchy of ethical understanding.33 This 
makes it difficult to agree upon a progressive programme of ethical learning appropriate for a 
vertical curriculum. The experience of successful “whole of curriculum” designs referred to 
above34 suggests that this is not impossible and may indeed provide another vector for 
individual law schools to develop a distinctive approach.  
In order to engage colleagues with varying views it is worth considering the different 
learning methods that might appeal to people with very different approaches to their students’ 
learning. 
LEARNING METHODS 
Student Law Clinic 
The most profound learning comes from the experience of working with real or at least 
realistic cases. This provides a depth of insight into academic study which takes students’ 
understanding far beyond the skills they are also acquiring. The variety of approaches which 
may be used include the in-house advice clinic and placements in other organisations 
providing legal advice and representation including law firms and NGOs. This is not the 
place for a full discussion of clinical methods.35 It should, however, be realised that ethical 
dilemmas are inherent in working with real clients.36 Given this, the work at La Trobe in 
Melbourne in designing a student law clinic especially designed to develop students’ ethical 
understanding and reflection is worth exploring. They argue:  
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Clinical method … properly implemented, offers unrivalled opportunities 
for exploring and examining the ethical dimension of legal practice. The key 
to this … is the existence of spontaneity or “randomness” in the clinic 
environment. This provides a rich and realistic learning opportunity for both 
individual student practice and group discussion that shares their 
experiences and application of ethical decision-making strategies.37  
 
It may be objected that the cost of clinical experience puts it beyond the reach of many law 
schools, especially if it is to be made available to all students. Donald Nicolson has presented 
low-cost ways of introducing an extra-curricular clinic which nevertheless informs students’ 
other learning.38 Some of these techniques, such as developing student responsibility for 
clinic management, may be transferable to the sort of curricular clinic that would meet my 
proposals for integration, and Nicolson explores these in his 2013 article.39 
If real-client clinic is unavailable, much of the value of clinical learning may be achieved 
through the use of simulation.40 The key achievement of both real-client and simulated 
clinical approaches is that, instead of students being asked what they would do in a particular 
situation they are placed in that situation and have to do it, with opportunities of reflection to 
follow.41 This provides a much better basis for developing a learning spiral42 which can be 
incorporated into the integral role of legal ethics to meet Bruner’s ideal of a spiral 
curriculum.43 As a learning design tool it has the further advantage of being able to control 
students’ experience in ways unavailable in the real-client clinic.  
Socio-Legal Studies 
Most student learning is likely to take place in the classroom or on-line and with more 
conventional student activities. This is no obstacle to developing the insights of a critical 
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understanding of the role of lawyers. Indeed, the development of the Law in Context 
movement44 is premised on this approach and has been enhanced by the development of 
socio-legal scholarship in the last 40 years. As John Baldwin and Gwynn Davies have 
argued:  
 
[I]t is principally through empirical study of the practice of law…and in 
studying the way legal processes and decisions impact upon the citizen, that 
the disciplines of sociology and, to a lesser degree, philosophy, psychology, 
and economics have entered into and enriched the study of law. This 
multidisciplinary research has, in turn, influenced many aspects of legal 
practice…Even the rules and procedures of the law, which can seem arcane 
and specialist, reflect this influence.45 
 
This analytical approach is key to a critical understanding of the values of law and of the role 
of lawyers in relation to those values. As such it properly lies at the heart of any critical 
liberal education as well as one which is to meet the requirements of the LETR. One 
objection should be addressed. Amongst the research findings reported by the LETR is the 
view of practitioners placing socio-legal studies towards the bottom of a ranking of legal 
subjects in the minds of practitioners.46 However, it should not be concluded therefore that it 
is in fact undervalued by practitioners, for there is a methodological flaw here. “Socio-legal 
studies” is included in a list of knowledge items such as “contract law” and “tort law” into 
which it simply does not fit. It is a research and learning approach, not a subject. It is no 
wonder that the practitioners consulted did not know where to place it. It is worth noticing 
that “professional ethics” appears in one of the two top-ranked positions in each category of 
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practitioners, ahead of the Foundations of Legal Knowledge and other conventional subjects. 
This, therefore, is not evidence that practitioners do not value socio-legal studies and good 
arguments are made for their relevance to meeting the requirements of a liberal legal 
education in the context of the LETR Report by Jessica Guth and Chris Ashford.47 What is 
more, Andrew Sanders makes a powerful argument that without a socio-legal approach there 
is a risk that students will only learn about law for the rich and never understand how it 
impacts upon most members of society.48 
The vibrancy of socio-legal research and its appeal to students also makes it an ideal way 
of developing research-led teaching. This is not simply to develop thoughtful critical future 
lawyers but lies at the heart of the liberal project of higher education. As the former 
Archbishop of Canterbury recently argued:  
 
…helping to shape a culture in which it is harder to treat the public as fools, 
harder to exploit prejudice or fear, and easier to conduct constructive 
argument in public without the melodrama of extreme polarisation. “The 
truth will make you free” is a text that as a religious believer I care about 
deeply. Its application to the life of the university in the wider society is not 
the least important aspect of what it means.49 
 
For students of law a critical understanding of the values of law and legal practice is key to 
this. 
Moral Philosophy 
My proposal for integration of ethics across the undergraduate curriculum will only work if a 
reasonable proportion of faculty colleagues are supportive. Not all will be keen to be 
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involved in clinical developments, other approaches to active learning or socio-legal 
approaches. For colleagues whose preference is for theoretical teaching the ethical issues 
raised by the LETR report may be approached through moral philosophy, either in its purer 
form or as mediated through the jurisprudence literature. Jurisprudence was once seen as core 
to the undergraduate study of law, with all but two of the 1965 law schools making it 
compulsory.50 By 1974 this had dropped to 18 out of 25 university law degrees51 and 12 out 
of 20 polytechnics.52 By 2004 only 34% of law schools had a compulsory jurisprudence/legal 
theory module with a further 14% incorporating it into a compulsory module.53 Moreover, it 
is only ranked 13th amongst “knowledge subjects” by practitioners.54 However, I would argue 
that whether as a discrete module or as an intellectual approach to be applied at more than 
one point during the degree, it has an important role in ensuring the intellectual challenge and 
critical edge that a liberal legal education should provide.  
Martha Nussbaum proposed a variety of approaches to introducing philosophy into legal 
education some 20 years ago and I can do no better than present her concluding justification 
for the proposal:  
 
This world is a philosophical world, whether we like it or not, a world in 
which philosophical ideas and conceptions are understood or 
misunderstood, for better or for worse, and action is taken as a result of 
these understandings. At the same time, for all her weird detachment, and 
indeed perhaps in part because of that detachment, the philosopher is a 
contributor to the world. Her thoughts and arguments have pertinence to the 
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clearly. I think that these facts give us some powerful reasons to incorporate 
the teaching of philosophy into legal education.55 
 
William Twining has recently presented as one of his four priorities in responding to the 
LETR: ‘Design modules, courses and materials on ethics and values suitable for each stage of 
LET.”56 As to teaching jurisprudence he said:  
 
 
I teach jurisprudence and throughout my career I have thought that I was 
dealing with values, ethics and normative questions. Questions about personal 
and professional integrity are philosophical questions: what is ethical 
integrity for a lawyer presupposes a view on what it means to have individual 
integrity as a person.  …  
I readily admit that in my teaching of jurisprudence I could have focused 
more on issues of individual integrity in relation to lawyering and judging. I 
did once try to use Plato’s Gorgias as a set text, but I could have done much 
more. Personally, I would have no difficulty in adjusting a jurisprudence 
course to accommodate such issues. There is a rich treasury of dilemmas and 
examples, and Dworkin’s Justice for Hedgehogs57 and Kronman’s The Lost 
Lawyer,58 among others, could serve as admirable and demanding texts. So I 
see opportunities rather than a threat to making explicit and relevant basic 
issues about values and ethics in academic curricula - nor do I see any 
objection to introducing serious philosophical debates into the later stages.59 
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There are many starting points and many routes through this rich treasury and many of our 
students would benefit.  
CONCLUSION 
UK higher legal education faces a number of challenges in a world where each law school 
may wish to develop a distinctive offering. However, the circumstances require sophisticated 
considerations. Students may join law degrees with aspirations to join the traditional legal 
professions, but the proportion who maintain that hope declines throughout the degree 
course.60 Many will end up in para-legal careers, others doing legal work in commercial or 
administrative organisations, yet others working in other ways in the economy. It will be hard 
for a law school to meet all these aspirations with one degree programme. Moreover, the 
emphasis on “employability” should not be taken to mean that a narrowly vocational 
approach will be attractive to potential employers. Richard Moorhead explains the experience 
of Washington & Lee Law School in the USA which found their students’ employability in 
jobs which required legal qualification declining when they introduced a new curriculum 
designed to focus on lawyers’ skills.61 The comparison needs to be made with care. The US 
JD is (subject to the relevant State Bar exam) the point of qualification, whereas in the UK 
the professional and apprenticeship stages follow. The fees US law students pay for their JD 
far exceed those paid by UK students. However, it may be a warning against undergraduate 
degrees introducing practice skills for their own sake. Experiential and contextual learning 
should be introduced to develop the person, not to meet narrow vocational objectives.  
It is probably the case that the elite sectors of the legal profession, especially when faced 
with hundreds of well-qualified applicants, see university law school status as a proxy for 
quality which avoids the need to consider something as complicated and hard to define as a 
particular approach to learning. Recent research at the Bar shows a strong preference for 
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graduates of high status law schools. 71% of all barristers went to Oxbridge or a Russell 
Group university. This figure went up to 75% in respect of those called to the Bar under the 
age of 30.62 Non-elite law schools will have an uphill struggle to challenge this tendency but 
their best chance is by developing well-educated critical individuals who have a deep 
understanding of the system in which they are interested, whether as practitioner or citizen. 
We can provide opportunities for our students to gain experience through their studies which 
Gandhi, an alumnus of my own law school, could only obtain through the experience of 
practice.  
 
My joy was boundless. I had learnt the true practice of law. I had learnt to 
find the better side of human nature and to enter men’s hearts. I realized the 
true function of a lawyer was to unite parties riven asunder. The lesson was 
so indelibly burnt into me, that a large part of my time during the twenty 
years of my practice as a lawyer was occupied in bringing about private 
compromises of hundreds of cases. I lost nothing thereby – not even money, 
certainly not my soul.63   
 
                                                          
*
 Professor of Legal Education, The City Law School, City University London. I am indebted 
to the journal’s anonymous referees. Errors and speculations remain my own.  
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